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BENJAMIN'S THEORY OF THE LYRIC 
DAVID E. WELLBERY 
Stanford University 
Benjamin's place in contemporary theoretical discussion is 
marked by ambiguity. On the one hand, his views are cited on nearly 
every question of importance to literary studies, a practice which cer- 
tainly evinces general consensus regarding the importance of his im- 
mense and diverse corpus of work. On the other hand, these citations 
often take the form of appeals to an oracular authority: that is, rather 
than encourage theoretical reflection, they replace it. Paradoxically, it 
is precisely Benjamin's omnipresence in critical discourse today that 
occludes a serious critical engagement with his writing. Everyone 
"knows" about Benjamin; his texts are dissolved in Gerede. Perhaps 
only a second forgetting can save him. 
This situation commands modesty on the part of a teacher or a 
writer who would take up Benjamin's work, and it is a modest task I 
have set for myself here. I offer a commentary on the essay from 1914, 
Zwei Gedichte von Friedrich HOlderlin.' Commentary is the dis- 
course of modesty in that it does not seek to place itself above the text 
that is its subject matter, but rather endeavors to efface itself before 
the inner movement of that text. Hence, I will offer no decisions on the 
issues of the Benjamin debate such as the question of mysticism or 
materialism, nor any contributions to the periodization question, nor 
any speculations about the situation of the modern intellectual. I will 
simply try to adhere as closely as possible to the thought of this single 
text and to arrive at a statement of what Benjamin's theory of the lyric 
is. 
I. The Mode of Discourse: asthetischer Kommentar 
The initial gesture of Benjamin's text is one of delimitation, 
distinguishing the mode of discourse of his own study from that of 
traditional aesthetic inquiry. This complex rhetorical operation starts 
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by contrasting "generic construction" as the primary task of tradi- 
tional aesthetic theorizing and asthetischer Kommentar as the task of 
Benjamin's inquiry. ( Let us note that Benjamin does not deny the 
legitimacy of genre construction. On the contrary, his opening move is 
to develop precisely such a construction, and in doing so he relies on 
others.) The term "commentary" is a rich one, resonant with a 
variegated history. Out of the fluidum of determinations that sur- 
rounds the term, Benjamin's opposition selects one: the discourse of 
commentary has as its object of study individual works as opposed to 
general regularities (genres). 
Subsequently we shall see that the concept "individual work" is a 
problematic one for Benjamin: that the work itself, thought of as a 
completely determinate individuality, is an "absolute," an Idee in the 
Kantian sense, and therefore inaccessible to analysis. For the present, 
however, it is useful to take the opposition "general regularities" vs. 
"individual works" unproblematically, and to ask: does this opposi- 
tion specify commentary as a hermeneutic inquiry? Hermeneutics, 
after all, involves interpretive engagement with individual works. This 
is an important question to ask because the present climate of 
theoretical discussion is characterized, especially in Germany, by an 
expansive, colonizing use of the term hermeneutics. Indeed, a certain 
universality ( Universalitatsanspruch) has even been attributed to the 
term, an attribution which has successfully masked the contingency 
and limitations of hermeneutics as a discursive formation.' In view of 
this ideological expansionism, then, it is useful to stress the non-her- 
meneutic, the other-than-hermeneutic potential of the concept of 
commentary.' The first point to be made in this regard is that 
Benjamin never employs, throughout the text, the terms Verstehen or 
Interpretieren as designations of his own mode of inquiry. These 
terms, the leading ones of hermeneutics, designate mental or cogni- 
tive operations. As such-and in contrast to a term such as "commen- 
tary," which alludes to a tradition of textual practices-they set into 
motion that process of ideological universalization mentioned above 
which disavows the discursive specificity and positionality of the her- 
meneutic enterprise. But beyond this lexical matter, Benjamin's text 
bears the marks of a polemic against the predominant mode of her- 
meneutics available at the time of its writing, for Diltheyan her- 
meneutics takes as its object of inquiry that subjective process of crea- 
tion rooted in the "Person oder Weltanschauung des Verfassers" (II, 
105) for which Benjamin declares his unconcern. Benjaminian 2




commentary, by contrast, is directed toward an objective moment, not 
the process of Dichten, but das Gedichtete, the sphere of the work's 
truth. Benjamin repudiates the vitalist ideology of immediate expres- 
sion which animates virtually all of post-Diltheyan Literaturwissen- 
shali. 
Of course, in the work of Heidegger, and later in that of 
Gadamer, this antisubjectivism (antipsychologism, antiexpres- 
sionism) becomes itself a central feature of hermeneutics and Adorno 
was certainly correct to point out-precisely as regards the concept of 
das Gedichtete-affinities between the former and Benjamin.' I cer- 
tainly do not want to deny these affinities here. On the contrary, it is 
my view that a ramified account of the Heidegger/Benjamin relation- 
ship is one of the central tasks facing contemporary theoretical discus- 
sion: one need only think of the astonishing parallels between Die Zeit 
des Weltbildes and Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technishen 
Reproduzierbarkeit. For the present, however, and within the con- 
text of a polemical operation which seeks to resist a "hermeneutic" 
appropriation of Benjamin's text, I would accentuate an important dif- 
ference between Benjamin's commentary and the Heidegger/ 
Gadamer version of an ontologically based hermeneutics. This dif- 
ference emerges first of all on the terminological plane: Benjamin 
remains true to the term "aesthetic" and the tradition of philo- 
sophical inquiry it designates, whereas both Heidegger and Gadamer 
reject this tradition as a version of modern subjectivism. This same 
difference reveals itself on the level of practice as well: Benjamin 
avoids altogether the drift toward turgid paraphrase, the antiartistic 
orientation toward the "essential message," that is the price both 
Heidegger and Gadamer pay for their rejection of aesthetics. The 
abstract negation of aesthetics as a means to recover the truth and 
objectivity of art runs aground, in Heidegger and Gadamer, on the reef 
of semanticism. Benjamin seeks something of the same pre-modern 
objectivity, but through a mediation of the modern tradition of 
aesthetic inquiry. 
But how is Benjamin's practice of aesthetic commentary defined 
positively other than in its concern for individual works? Benjamin 
acknowledges that commentary has existed, albeit as subordinate to 
genre construction, throughout the tradition of aesthetic inquiry, 
adding, however, that it has been restricted to "classical" works, 
above all to tragedies. This statement allows us to define an essential 
feature of Benjamin's strategy here (and of his work generally). He 3
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establishes his own discourse through a displacement of a particular 
discursive tradition. The traditional form of commentary is directed to 
the work as "classical"; its modesty and marginality are grounded in 
the classical authority of the work commented upon. Benjamin's dis- 
course, however, carries this practice of commentary into domains 
from which it has been previously excluded, taking as its object non- 
classical texts (those of HOlderlin) from a subsidiary genre (the lyric). 
He endows the non-classical with the authority which traditionally is 
only accorded a limited canon; he maintains the stance of commen- 
tary (the acceptance of the authority of the text commented upon), but 
explodes the historical and generic limits of its use. It is exactly this 
strategy of displacement with regard to the notion of commentary that 
Benjamin makes explicit in his essay on Brecht's poetry: "Der Kom- 
mentar geht von der Klassizitat seines Textes and damit gleichsam 
von einem Vorurteil aus. . . . Und es ist ein sehr dialektischer 
Sachverhalt, der diese archaische Form, den Kommentar, der 
zugleich eine autoritare Form ist, im Dienste einer Dichtung in 
Anspruch nimmt, der nicht allein nichts Archaisches an sich hat 
sondern auch dem, dem heute Autoritiit zuerkannt wird, die Stirne 
bietet" (II, 539). If Kommentar is, as Benjamin formulates it else- 
where, the "Grundform jiidischen Denkens" (III, 106), then his own 
critical strategy-dialectically theological-is to apply this form to 
the aesthetic domain: to endow the secular text with an authority 
which, by tradition, it cannot possess. 
It is important, I think, to stress the double nature of this displace- 
ment vis-à-vis the concept of the "classical." At once preserving the 
authority of that concept and dispersing it, Benjamin's aesthetic com- 
mentary contains both these moments, and it is as if to underline this 
point that he concludes his introductory lines with a further distinc- 
tion: where commentary has moved beyond the limits of the 
"classical" traditionally conceived, Benjamin remarks, it has lost its 
philosophical intention, has become philological commentary. 
Philological commentary can direct itself to all texts, regardless of 
their classical character, but in doing so it homogenizes them, 
integrates them into an order of historical facts. The complete 
elimination of the moment of classicity nullifies the emphatic truth of 
the work, which Benjamin wants to preserve; it is an abstract (as 
opposed to dialectical) secularization of classical authority and as 
such it reduces-to take a related distinction from the Wahlver- 
wandtscheen essay-the Wahrheitsgehalt of the work to a 4




philological Sachgehalt. What he here calls aesthetic commentary 
(and later, for reasons it would be interesting to speculate on, Kritik) 
has precisely this truth as its object of inquiry. 
II. Introduction of the Concept: das Gedichtete 
Having circumscribed his own mode of discourse, Benjamin 
moves on to define his object of study. This object-that which 
aesthetic commentary would disclose (aufweisen, ermine /n) -is 
called das Gedichtete. Not merely the terminological innovation, but 
also the considerable labor of explication that he devotes to the intro- 
duction of this concept point to the extraordinary complexity (and 
intellectual ambition) of Benjamin's thought here. In fact, one would 
be hard pressed to name a work in literary theory which is more con- 
cientious as regards this decisive issue of the constitution of the object 
of inquiry. The fact is that Benjamin does not provide a compact and 
punctual definitions of das Gedichtete, but rather situates the con- 
cept, as it were, stereoptically within an array of frames of reference. 
He defines it five times over and each of these five "takes" on the con- 
cept engages fundamental issues in the philosophy of literature. Let us 
consider them in sequence. 
A. Anaclitic Definition. Das Gedichtete is first defined through 
an Anlehnung on tradition. In other words, Benjamin gives himself 
support by leaning on, but at the same time bending to his use, three 
traditional terms drawn from what we can call classical-romantic 
aesthetics. Of course, the subsequent definitions of das Gedichtete are 
anaclitic in this intertextual sense as well insofar as they rework pre- 
existing conceptualizations of the literary object of study: but in this 
initial case the terms, and the authors associated with them, are 
openly and deliberately cited. They are innere Form (Humboldt), 
Gehalt (Goethe), and Ideal a priori (Novalis). It would be senseless 
to attempt to say anything definite here about "influences": we are not 
faced with a genuine Auseinandersetzung with the theories of the 
three named writers. Rather, the traditional terms, each of which is 
surrounded by a nimbus of associations, have been detached from the 
particular discursive contexts in which they were formulated and set 
into the text (hineinmontiert) to resonate. This move at once estab- 
lishes a certain legitimacy for what is to follow, and indicates a vague 
direction for the ensuing construction of the theoretical object. Thus, 
all that can be rigorously said on the basis of these citations is that the 
concept das Gedichtete names a structure which includes what are 5
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called formal and contentual elements, a structure which, as the unity 
of form and content, cannot be grasped within that categorical opposi- 
tion. This effort to think beyond the dichotomy of form and content, it 
seems to me, is what Benjamin borrows from his classical-romantic 
precursors, a point which is made explicit in a later passage: "Das 
Gedichtete unterscheidet sich als Kategorie asthetischer Unter- 
suchung dadurch, dass es die fundamentale asthetische Einheit von 
Form und Stoff in sich bewahrt und anstatt beide zu trennen, ihre im- 
manente notwendige Verbindung in sich auspragt" (11. 106). Of 
course, nothing is more common in literary theory than the appeal to 
the unity of form and content, an appeal often supported through 
reference to the authority of classical-romantic thought. The proof of 
Benjamin's theoretical stature will be the degree to which he is able to 
transcend this abstract claim and to think concretely the nature of this 
aesthetic unity. That such is indeed the case becomes clear as we 
move to the second conceptual take on das Gedichtete. 
B. Praxis-oriented Definition. The central terms here are task 
and solution (or fulfillment), terms that are drawn from the sphere of 
what we might call practical doing, for it is activities-praxis-which 
have tasks that they either fulfill or do not. The term "task" 
(Aufgabe-that which is given up to the activity to be done) receives 
initial accentuation, but it must be emphasized that, even as das 
Gedichtete is the task of the poem. it is also its Erfullung. It is the 
sphere in which task and fulfillment are mediated and pass over into 
one another. What I think is at play in this aspect of Benjamin's defini- 
tion is the Aristotelian concept of poeisis as an activity that has its end 
in itself. The task which poeisis fulfills is not, as in practical/purpo- 
sive activity, extrinsic to the activity: it is not given in advance, but 
rather emerges only within the activity. The task is its own accom- 
plishment. Hence, the task can only be derived, constructed, from the 
activity, in our case, the poem: "Nicht danach kann die Bewertung 
sich richten, wie der Dichter seine Aufgabe gelost habe, vielmehr 
bestimmt der Ernst und die GrOsse der Aufgabe selbst die Bewertung. 
Denn diese Aufgabe wird aus dem Gedichte selbst abgeleitet" ( II. 
105). 
C. Structural Definition. Das Gedichtete is thirdly defined as a 
particular type of structure, as the "unity" of two orders: It is "die 
geistig-anschauliche Struktur derjenigen Welt, von der das Gedicht 
zeugt" (II, 105): the "synthetische Einheit der geistigen und 
anschaulichen Ordnung" (II, 106). The structure in question, then, 6
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relates two sub-structures-a sensate-perceptual order and an 
intellectual order-and the name of this relation is "Einheit." The 
terms "anschaulich" and "geistig" remain relatively vague here, 
although they certainly carry a Kantian, or idealist resonance. What 
Benjamin focuses on. rather, is the nature of the relation into which 
these orders are brought, and it is here that his theoretical project 
reveals affinities with the formalist-structuralist tradition of aesthetic 
thought. As mentioned, this relation is called unity, but its more 
precise definition is that of Identitat. The unity of the two orders is 
achieved when they are brought into a relation of "identity." Identity 
does not mean here sameness of substance. It is a relational concept, 
and it implies that both orders, and all the elements within them, 
belong to a single system of relations which is determined by a "law": 
what Benjamin calls das Identitatsgesetz. Each individual element. 
then, is a condensation of "functions" within the functional system (or 
Funktionseinheit); it has its identity only within this system, and the 
system governs all the sensate-perceptual elements (from rhythm and 
punctuation through "images") and all the intellectual elements (the 
concepts set into play by the text) equally. No element can be defined 
"outside" the text. Another way of putting this is to say that the text 
contains no "elements," for the self-identity of the element 
presupposes that it exist outside the system: "Der Darstellung des 
Gedichteten I kann es nicht um den Nachweis sogenannter letzter Ele- 
mente zu tun sein. Denn solche gibt es innerhalb des Gedichteten 
nicht" ( II, 108). Das Gedichtete is a sphere of relations and each 
apparent element is really only a bundle of these relations, a func- 
tional nexus which refers to all the other functions operative within the 
text. 
D. Semantic Definition. I want semantic to be understood here 
in the strong sense in which one says, for example, that a semantics for 
a language will necessarily contain a theory of truth in that language, 
for Benjamin is adamant that das Gedichtete is the sphere of the text's 
"truth": "In ihr 'der Sphare des Gedichteten I soil jener eigen- 
tumliche Bezirk erschlossen werden, der die Wahrheit der Dichtung 
enthalt. Diese 'Wahrheit; die gerade die ernstesten Kunstler von 
ihren Schopfungen so dringend behaupten, soli verstanden sein als 
Gegenstandlichkeit ihres Schaffens, als die Erfullung der jeweiligen 
kiinstlerischen Aufgabe" (II. 105). It is this insistence on the 
emphatic truth (recall what was said above regarding "classicity") of 
the work that distinguishes Benjamin's theoretical construction from 7
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the formalist-structuralist position to which, in other respects, it bears 
such notable similarities; the systematic relations disclosed by 
structuralist analysis are indifferent as regards their truth value. At the 
same time, however, it should be stressed that Benjamin's notion of 
truth is by no means easily assimilable into one of the "truth theories" 
available today. Indeed, the uncharacteristic use of quotation marks 
at that point where he introduces the concept suggests a conceptual 
swerve away from any traditional use of the term. The truth of the 
poetic text is immanent to that structural sphere of identity which is 
das Gedichtete; it is the passage of task into fulfillment, the realiza- 
tion of this passage in what Benjamin calls the Gegenstandlichkeit 
(roughly and provisionally: material objectification) that emerges 
from poetic writing. 
E. Methodological Definition. The methodological awareness 
that caused Saussure to write, at the outset of his Cours, that "it is the 
[theoretical' viewpoint that creates the object "` of study, is manifest 
as well in Benjamin's remarks. Das Gedichtete is not an object in 
itself, but is the product (as well as the object) of the inquiry: "Diese 
Sphere Ides Gedichtetenl ist Erzeugnis and Gegenstand der 
Untersuchung zugleich. Sie selbst kann nicht mehr mit dem Gedicht 
verglichen werden, sondern ist vielmehr das einzig Feststellbare der 
Untersuchung" (II, 105). Das Gedichtete is a model produced 
through an abstraction from the full determination of the text in its 
actuality, a virtual object. 
III. Metaconceptual Definition 
The fivefold definition of das Gedichtete can be called a "con- 
ceptual" definition insofar as it specifies the determinations which 
give the concept its "content." But one can also ask the question: what 
kind of concept is das Gedichtete? How does it emerge as concept? 
Let us call this step from content to structure a metaconceptual reflec- 
tion, that is, a reflection which asks after the conditions of possibility 
of the concept employed. It is on this metaconceptual level (a 
level rarely attained in literary-theoretical work) that Benjamin's 
theoretical enterprise acquires its genuinely synthetic power, for it is 
here that we discover how the five aspects of the conceptual defini- 
tion-anaclitic, praxis-oriented, structural, semantic, and methodo- 
logical-fit together, how their specific array delineates one and the 
same sphere. 
We can perhaps get a handle on this very intricate movement of 8




Benjamin's thought by contrasting it with a more familiar paradigm. 
The classical structuralist position defines its object of study as a 
"system of relations" and we have seen that both the structural and 
methodical aspects of Benjamin's definition reveal remarkable 
similarities to this structuralist view. However, according to the 
structuralist position, this system itself is not relational; it is rather 
conceived as a positive entity which can be attended to in a theoretical 
regard. The task of analysis is to develop a model of this empirical- 
psychological object, the conditions of possibility of which are never 
called into question. 
But it is precisely the conditions of possibility of the concept das 
Gedichtete which concern Benjamin in the second and third 
paragraphs of his essay, and of course it is the thought of Kant, 
specifically the notion of !dee, to which he turns. Kant writes: 
Ich verstehe unter der Idee einen notwendigen Vernunftbegriff, 
dem kein kongruierender Gegenstand in den Sinnen gegeben 
werden kann. . . . Sie sind Begriffe der reinen Vernunft: denn sie 
betrachten alles Erfahrungserkenntnis als bestimmt durch eine 
absolute Totalitirt der Bedingungen. Sie sind nicht willkiirlich 
erdichtet, sondern durch die Natur der Vernunft selbst 
aufgegeben, und beziehen rich daher notwendigerweise auf den 
ganzen Verstandesgebrauch. Sie sind endlich transzendent und 
Ubersteigen die Grenze alter Erfahrung, in welcher also niemals 
ein Gegenstand vorkommen kann, der der transzendentalen Idee 
adiiquat ware.' 
Ideen belong to the conditions of possibility of our knowing insofar as 
they anticipate the totality of the object in question; this unpresen- 
table totality orients inquiry by, as it were, casting its light back onto 
the movement of the investigation. In Benjamin's view, the concept of 
das Gedichtete occupies a space defined by two such ideas: on the one 
hand, the poem itself (das Gedicht), in its full actuality, and on the 
other hand, "life" (das Leben). Das Gedichtete is the limit concept 
(Grenzbegriff) that marks the differentiation and articulation of these 
two spheres, which, as ideas, cannot themselves be given to a repre- 
sentation. Thus, far from being a positive, empirical entity, das 
Gedichtete is a relational sphere, the site where Gedicht and Leben 
pass over into one another. 
The task of the analysis, then, is to chart the differential move- 9
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ment-the limit-between "poem" and "life." Within this move- 
ment, each of the contentual determinations of the concept das 
Gedichtete acquires its specific function and sense. As regards the 
praxis-oriented perspective, we can note that for Kant the Ideen are 
"aufgegeben" (above quotation). For Benjamin, the "task" posed in 
the Idee likewise implies the idea of "fulfillment" ("Denn Aufgabe 
and Losung sind nur in abstracto trennbar" III, 1071). Hence "life" 
becomes the "Idee der Aufgabe," the poem the "Idee der LOsung," 
and das Gedichtete is defined as the sphere in which task and fulfill- 
ment are mediated. In terms of the structural definition, it is useful to 
recall that the Kantian Idee designates the "synthetische Einheit" 
(p. 359) of all the determinations of its object, and that this is precisely 
the term Benjamin employs with regard to das Gedichtete. However, 
this unity (or structural identity) is never complete in das Gedichtete; 
such thorough-going structuration is, rather, the methodological goal 
defined by the two ideas in which the analysis would attain its "abso- 
lute": "Die Ermittlung des reinen Gedichteten, der absoluten 
Aufgabe, muss nach allem Gesagten das rein methodische, ideelle 
Ziel bleiben. Das refine Gedichtete wiirde aufhoren Grenzbegriff zu 
sein: es ware Leben oder Gedicht" (II, 108). Thus, the 
methodological and structural definitions go hand in hand: the 
abstractive "Absehen" from certain determinations of the poem is 
conditioned by the fact that the full determinateness of the text (its 
"Totalitat der Bedingungen," in Kant's terms)-like the totality or 
"Funktionseinheit" of "life"-is "nicht erfassbar" (II, 108). Finally, 
the semantic definition: if the "truth" of the work resides in this 
sphere, it is because das Gedichtete is the passage between the two 
ideas "life" and "poem." The truth in question here is not an 
adequatio of works/ideas to things, but rather a self-determination of 
life through the poem: "Das Gedichtete erweist sich also als 
Ubergangssphare von der Funktionseinheit des Lebens zu der des 
Gedichts. In ihm bestimmt sich das Leben durch das Gedicht, die 
Aufgabe durch die Losung" (11, 107). Poetic writing does not mirror 
being, but rather delineates, and in delineating brings forth, the con- 
stellation of being. This constellation -"ein durch die Kunst 
bestimmter Lebenszusammenhang" (II, 107)-has the form of a 
"geistig-anschauliche Struktur." 
The metaconceptual reflection, then, gathers together the praxis- 
oriented, structural, semantic and metholological aspects of the con- 
cept das Gedichtete by locating that concept in a structural space 10
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defined by the absolute poles of Gedicht and Leben, "ideas" in the 
Kantian sense. In doing so, this arc of reflection culminates in an 
ontological definition of das Gedichtete as the self-delineation of 
being through art. But this conception (especially the formulation: In 
ihm (dem Gedichteten) bestimmt sich das Leben durch das 
Gedicht . . .") seems to verge on a vitalist, expressivist view such as 
we find in Dilthey. It is in part to combat the identification of his 
thought with such a view that Benjamin introduces the concept of 
Mythos: 
Gerade die schwachsten Leistungen der Kunst beziehen sich auf 
das unmittelbare Geftihl des Lebens, die starksten aber, ihrer 
Wahrheit nach, auf eine dem Mythischen verwandte Sphare: das 
Gedichtete. Das Leben ist allgemein das Gedichtete der 
Gedichte -so liesse sich sagen; doch je unverwandelter der 
Dichter die Lebenseinheit zur Kunsteinheit tiberzuftihren sucht, 
desto mehr erweist er sich als Stomper. (II, 107) 
The causal-expressive generation of text by life disqualifies the 
product. Only when life, in determining itself through art, makes its 
passage through the detour and transformation of the mythic does it 
achieve truth and genuine aesthetic dignity. The concept of Mythos 
does not designate an inherited narrative representation (for this no- 
tion Benjamin employs the terms Mythologie), but a structure in 
which the elements achieve a maximum degree of Verbundenheit (II, 
109). It is this feature of structural binding which brings the concepts 
of Mythos and das Gedichtete into such proximity that the categories 
of the former can be applied (through a process Benjamin himself calls 
Anlehnung 107() to the latter. At the same time, however, 
Benjamin is careful to distinguish the two concepts. Indeed, the 
closing sentence of the theoretical introduction to the essay indicates 
that the two concepts are related not merely by similarities and dif- 
ferences, but rather that das Gedichtete, as the particular sort of 
structural unity it is, comes about through an operation performed on 
the mythic: "Wahrend die Analysis der grossen Dichtungen nicht 
zwar auf den Mythos, aber auf eine durch die Gewalt der 
gegeneinanderstrebenden mythischen Elemente gezeugte Einheit als 
eigentlichen Ausdruck des Lebens stossen wird" (II, 108). The struc- 
ture of das Gedichtete, earlier defined as the "Einheit der geistigen 
and anschaulichen Ordnung," is here declared to be an "Einheit" of 11
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conflictual mythic elements. In other words, das Gedichtete comes 
about as an overcoming of the mythic, a negation of the mythic 
conflict in a structure that brings that conflict (that Gegen- 
einanderstreben) to rest. 
IV. The Argument of Benjamin's Holderlin Reading, 
The basic task of the HOlderlin reading is to demonstrate how his 
texts enact the problematic of das Gedichtete elaborated in the 
theoretical introduction. This task is accomplished across two phases 
or argument. First, Benjamin devotes a brief analysis to the text 
Dichtermut, showing that it is determined on the one hand by a 
reliance on the "mythological"-that is, a set of borrowings from a 
narrative system that is given outside the text and which the text can 
therefore not integrate into its own order-and on the other hand by a 
diffuse concept of Leben. Dichtermut, in other words, is revealed to 
be a text in which das Gedichtete is not fully achieved, in which that 
sphere is characterized by "Vereinzelung der Gestalt" and 
"Beziehungslosigkeit des Geschehens" (II, 1 1 1 ). This analysis then 
sets up a contrastive background against which the realization of das 
Gedichtete as "synthetische Einheit der anschaulichen and geistigen 
Ordnung" can be demonstrated with regard to the poem Blodigkeit. 
Only this second phase of Benjamin's reading will concern me here. 
The reading of Blodigkeit addresses itself to four thematic spheres 
(each marked off typographically by paragraph divisions): 1) the 
abstractly defined structural "identity" of orders in the text; 2) the 
order of the Lebendigen; 3) the order of the Goiter, 4) the nature of 
Mut or Blodigkeit. My procedure will be to consider in this section 
the first three phases of this reading together. In the subsequent sec- 
don of my commentary I will compare the dynamics of Benjamin's 
argument with a semiotic problematic which Benjamin himself 
elaborated in a pair of theoretical fragments written some three years 
after the Holderlin essay. Via this detour through the philosophy of 
signification I hope to prepare an understanding of the final (4) turn of 
Benjamin's reading, the discussion of which will return us to the ques- 
tion of the "mythic." 
The structural node which provides for Benjamin's reading its 
point of departure is given in the lines from strophe III: "Denn, seit 
Himmlischen gleich Menschen, ein einsam Wild / Und die Him- 
mlischen selbst fiihret, der Einkehr zu / Der Gesang " The 
analysis of these lines focuses on their rhetorical strategy The 12
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paratactic emendation ("und die Himmlischen selbst") brings about a 
sublation of the simile preceding it such that the two orders which the 
simile compared-and which therefore were separated as paradigm 
and copy-are drawn into, and become functions of, one and the same 
order, that of Gesang. In tracing out this rhetorical movement 
Benjamin establishes the trajectory for his entire reading. It will be a 
question here not of "applying" the conceptual apparatus of the intro- 
duction to a particular text, but rather of showing how that con- 
ceptual problematic engenders the very movement of the text. Thus, 
Benjamin reads the equalization of "men" and "gods" in "song" as a 
figuration of das Gedichtete: the poem performs the emergence of 
that "Identitat der anschaulichen und geistigen Formen unter-und 
miteinander-die raumzeitliche Durchdringung aller Gestalten in 
einem geistigen Inbegriff, dem Gedichteten ." (II, 112). The first 
phase of the analysis, then, establishes a grid of equivalences, which 









This schema can be considered as a conceptual map for the remainder 
of Benjamin's analysis, which undertakes to articulate the inner logic 
and movement of each of the terms arrayed here. In this way, the 
abstract character of the initial interpretive hypothesis is overcome in 
the specific dynamics of the reading. 
The figuration of the anschauliche Ordnung in the order of the 
Lebendigen unfolds as a metaphorical spatialization: "Die 
Lebendigen sind, jeweils deutlich, in dieser Welt Holderlins, die 
Erstreckung des Raumes, der gebreitete Plan, in d e m . . . sich das 
Schicksal erstreckt" (II, 113). Decisive here is that the space of the 
"living" is not thought as volume, but rather as two-dimensional 
surface, as plane. And if, as Benjamin claims, both "living" and 
"gods" are only "Dimensionen" of das Gedichtete, then we can say 
that the first of these dimensions is a certain horizontality. The cen- 
tral point, however, is that this horizontality does not enter the text as 
indefinite and empty expanse, but rather as a surface articulated, 
inscribed with an order (and hence related by "identity" to a geistige 
sphere). This is the thought that Benjamin develops with regard to the 13
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powerful second line of Holderlin's text: "Geht auf Wahrem dein 
Fuss nicht, wie auf Teppichen?" The line specifies the poet's 
"acquaintance" with the "living" as a patterned movement across a 
surface. This "walking out" is the poet's destiny; its every step consti- 
tutes the true. In what is probably the boldest move of his entire 
reading, Benjamin concretizes this notion of pattern by interpreting 
the carpets as "oriental": the poet's steps trace out the windings of the 
carpets' ornamental design. The notion of ornament forms the crux of 
Benjamin's reading: in its peculiar logic of "Lage" (II, 1 1 4), in which 
every point is at once determining of and determined by all others, the 
ornament-this asemantic inscription of a plane-realizes the 
Identitat der geistigen und anschaulichen Ordnung which is das 
Gedichtete. 
Of course, the poetic task is not yet complete. The ornament 
figures, to be sure, the unity of orders, but does so only with regard to 
the "living," the dimension of horizontality. There remains another 
dimension to be considered, that of the gods, a dimension which is 
characterized by plasticity (or Gestalt) and temporality. This is the 
sphere where das Geistige reigns, just as the living represent the 
sphere of Anschaulichkeit. Thus, it is no accident that at every point 
where Benjamin explicates the spatial figuration of the "living" he hits 
upon a moment of plasticity and temporality that signals the interven- 
tion of the spiritual/intellectual within the sensate/intuitive. This is 
the case with all his local readings in this section of the essay: the 
reading of the ornamental carpet, of the notion of Gelegenheit, of the 
phrase "zur Freude gereimt." What marks these interventions is in 
every case a "Dissonanz": "Diese Dissonanzen heben im 
dichterischen Gefage die aller riumlichen Bestimmung ein- 
wohnende zeitliche Identitat und damit die absolut bestimmende 
Natur des geistigen Daseins innerhalb der identischen Erstreckung 
hervor" (II, 117). Dissonance-this differential strife-is the unity of 
the two "gegeneinanderstrebenden" orders within the order of 
Anschaulichkeit, the realization of das Gedichtete as absolute 
script. 
The integration of the living into the poet's destiny-the articula- 
tion of a spiritual/intellectual principle across a horizontal plane - 
culminates in a peculiar deadening: a radical abstraction and 
"Vereinzelung" in the phrase "einem zu etwas"; an "Ent- 
personlichung" (II, 1 16) of the people on the surface of its mosaic-like 
arrangement. Benjamin calls this process "Versachlichung" ( II, 1 1 8), 14




a tendency toward reification, toward the material world of prose. At 
this point, the full significance of this notion cannot be stated, but I in- 
troduce it here in order to indicate the direction of the second move- 
ment which Benjamin's reading traces out, for the entire logic by 
which the gods-the geistige Ordnung-are brought into, and made 
functions of, the poetic destiny (Gesang) tends precisely toward such 
materialization and objectification, toward prosaic sobriety. 
As the "Gegensatz" (II, 118) of the living, the gods represent an 
intensive formative principle of plasticity. This principle is one of 
identity, but, whereas identity in the ornamental order of the living was 
constituted as the extensive relationality of locations on a surface, in 
the realm of the gods it appears as the intensive self-identity of the 
Gestalt. The Gestalt is the whole that it is by virtue of an inward con- 
centration, an immanent plasticity which Benjamin sees as a function 
of time. Thus, his discussion of the gods focuses on the phrases 
"der denkende Tag" and "Wende der Zeit," in which temporal, 
intellectual, and plastic-architectonic registers complexly interfuse. 
The time of the gods is not the linearity of horizontal articulation, but 
rather the full self-presence of the Gestalt to itself. The operation 
which the poet must perform with regard to this self-presence of the 
gods is more complex than in the case of the living. In effect, he inten- 
sifies the principle of Gestalt to such a degree that the principle 
reverses itself, becoming its opposite. This intensification or inner 
concentration moves first in the direction of the Idee, of absolute- 
presence, from which point it reigns sovereign over the poetic world: 
"Zugleich aber bedeutelni sie (die Gaud die reine Welt zeitlicher 
Plastik im Bewusstsein; die Idee wird in ihr herrschend; wo vordem 
das Wahre der Aktivitat des Dichters einbeschlossen war, tritt es nun 
beherrschend in sinnlicher Erftilltheit auf" (II, 120). A self-generat- 
ing, autonomous form, the commanding presence of the truth in the 
work of art: here the text brings to figuration the classical ideal of the 
artwork as "sinnliches Erscheinen der Idee" (Hegel), an ideal which 
was, of course, developed with reference to the Greek gods. And yet 
this point of absolute sovereignty, of the full self-presence of the 
Gestalt in the Idee is likewise the point at which the Gestalt becomes 
gestaltlos: "Die gleiche Identitatsbeziehung, die hier im intensiven 
Sinn zur zeitlichen Plastik der Gestalt fahrt, muss im extensiven 
Sinne zu einer unendlichen Gestaltforrn fahren, zu einer gleichsam 
eingesargten Plastik, in der die Gestalt mit dem Gestaltlosen 
identisch wird" (II, 120). At the extreme of their own principle where 15
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they attain to the full self-presence of the Idea, the gods die, they are 
"en-coffined," reified to dead objects, in which Gestalt and das 
Gestaltlose are indistinguishable. This deadening effect again carries 
the name of "Versachlichung" (II, 120); it is the movement by which 
the gods cease to rule the poetic cosmos and instead are made func- 
tions of that cosmos. This movement culminates in the phrase from 
the final strophe: "und von den Himmlischen / Einen bringen." 
Benjamin's commentary: "Die Gestaltung-das innerlich plastische 
Prinzip, ist so gesteigert, dass das Verhangnis der toten Form fiber 
den Gott hereingebrochen ist, dass-im Bilde zu sprechen -die 
Plastik von innen nach aussen umschlug und nun vollig der Gott zum 
Gegenstande wurde" (II, 121). Das Gedichtete is realized-this is 
the movement Holderlin's text enacts-when the commanding 
principle of the spiritual/intellectual order, the principle of self- 
presence, is broken. As "tote Unendlichkeit" the god is "brought": 
objectified "zum versachlichten Sein der Welt im Gedanken . . ." (II. 
121). 
V. Graphics and Gestalt 
Benjamin's commentary seeks to capture the problematics of das 
Gedichtete in the figurations! (and disfigurations!) movement of 
Holderlin's text. This movement is double: two "gewichtig sehr 
abgehobenen Ordnungen"-the "gods" and the "living"-proceed 
"in entgegengesetztem Rhythmus" (II, 113) through the poem in 
order finally to be integrated as functions of the poet's destiny, of das 
Gedichtete. In the theoretical introduction, these orders were called 
anschaulich and geistig, but their precise nature remained unclear. In 
the light of Benjamin's reading, however, they can be more precisely 
defined. Das Gedichtete proves to be the intersection of two modes of 
signification: graphics and Gestalt. 
I draw support for this thesis from two theoretical fragments by 
Benjamin dating from 1917 and entitled, respectively. Malerei und 
Graphik and Uber die Malerei oder Zeichen und Mal. These 
fragments develop what can be called semiotic concepts, but do so in 
such a radically innovative way that they cannot be assimilated to any 
existing semiotic theory. Indeed, it is precisely the generally accepted 
semiotic notion that graphic and painted representations belong to the 
same class which Benjamin's fragments put into question. The in- 
herited view considers semiotic phenomena in terms of the relation 
sign/signified object. Pictorial representations. be they graphic or 16




painted, signify by virtue of their similarity to the object and hence are 
iconic.' As such, they are distinguished, say. from written linguistic 
signs which refer to their objects by virtue of a rule or convention, and 
which Peirce, for instance, calls symbols. Benjamin's break with this 
classificational schema rests on the fact that he dispenses altogether 
with its semantic, or representational, basis: for him the relation 
sign/object signified is without theoretical pertinence. Instead, he 
organizes his investigation around the axis of material presentation, 
the relationality to the body of the viewer. This theoretical reorienta- 
tion yields a distinction between graphics and painting as belonging to 
two radically heterogeneous spheres. Painting is positioned 
perpendicularly to the ground, it stands opposite the viewer, whereas 
graphic works, at least in their originary form (e.g., childrens' 
drawings) are spread out horizontally. Nothing is said about content 
or representational force, which we (like semiotic theory generally) 
would ordinarily take to be the essential matter. Rather. Benjamin's 
thought establishes itself at a level of inquiry prior to semantic con- 
siderations, the level of material deployment, and it is here that he 
discloses an antinomy fundamental to art generally: "Man konnte von 
zwei Schnitten durch die Weltsubstanz reden: der Langschnitt der 
Malerei und der Querschnitt gewisser Graphiken" (II, 603). 
Of course I do not mean to claim that this distinction coincides 
with that between the "gods" and the "living": indeed, I will 
subsequently stress an important divergence between them. 
Neverthless, the similarities between the Holderlin essay and the 
aesthetic fragments are strong enough to warrant interpretive com- 
parison. This is especially the case as regards the graphic domain and 
the poetic figuration of the living. Both are characterized by a horizon- 
tal dimensionality across which the inscription is made. Further- 
more, Benjamin designates the living at one point as the "Zeichen und 
Schrift" of poetic destiny, just as the graphic sphere is said to be that 
of signs generally, one of whose subtypes is "Schriftzeichen." The 
correspondence becomes still more precise when we consider the 
analysis of the graphic line elaborated in the second fragment: "Die 
graphische Linie bezeichnet die Flache und bestimmt diese indem sie 
sie sich selbst als ihrem Untergrund zuordnet" (II, 603). This rela- 
tionship of line and ground recapitulates that between the "poet" and 
the "living" exemplified in the ornament. Finally, we can note that the 
first example from the graphic sphere that Benjamin alludes to is a 
mosaic laid out on the floor and that he likewise describes the 17
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"people" articulated by the poet's movement across their surface as a 
"Byzantine mosaic" (11, 106). What these points of contact reveal 
(and others could be cited) is the basis of Benjamin's reading of the 
"living": if they represent one of the fundamental dimensions of das 
Gedichtete, it is because they are figurations of a fundamental 
semiotic modality, the sphere of the graphic in general. 
Such rigorous equivalence cannot be established between the 
"gods" and painting. As we have seen, the central feature of the 
former is Gestalt, a concept which appears not at all in the aesthetic 
fragments (although plasticity and architectonics are mentioned in 
connection with the "painterly" region ). Painting belongs to the 
general sphere of the Mal (an untranslatable term) many of whose 
manifestations (blushing, for example) lack any configurational struc- 
ture whatsoever. There is nevertheless a certain affinity between the 
two which we can exploit in order to render more precise our under- 
standing of the function of the "gods" in Benjamin's argument. Note, 
for example, that both are characterized by a certain verticality (the 
perpendicular position of the painting, the golden Gangelband 
extending to earth from the heavens) that sets them in opposition to 
the graphic domain. The Mal is also linked to the Gestalt by virtue of 
its temporal structure, a simultaneity of past and future within the 
present that recalls that architectonic Holderlinian "Tag" and 
"Wende der Zeit." But the point of tangency that is most central for 
my purposes has to do with what might be called the emergence of the 
Mal, its Hervortreten (11, 605). The Mal comes forth out of its own 
center; it has no ground from which it differs, but rather appears in the 
self-sufficiency of its Erscheinen (II, 606). (The concept of self- 
sufficient appearing can only be formulated pleonastically.) It is here 
that we discover the core of the Benjaminian notion of Gestalt in its 
opposition to the graphic. Like the Mal, it emerges autonomously out 
of its own absolute concentration; it knows no difference and no back- 
ground: its identity is the intensive unity of the Idee. 
The opposition between graphics and painting, Benjamin writes. 
bears on the "mythische Verwurzelung" of art in general (II. 603). 
This statement clarifies what was said at the outset regarding the con- 
cept of My/hos. If das Gedichtete is a "durch die Gewalt der 
gegeneinanderstrebenden mythischen Elemente gezeugte Einheit" 
(II, 108), it is because it is the intersection of two modalities of 
signification: the spatial expanse of graphics and the temporal inten- 
sity of the Gestalt. These mythic tendencies find their expression in 18




the art of two different cultural spheres. The Gestalt, as sensate 
appearance of the Idea, is embodied in Greek art, whereas graphics, 
more ancient, expresses an Oriental or Asiatic principle: "Sie !die 
Kunst] entspringt mit dem Ornament aus dem Mythischen. Das 
asiatische Ornament ist mythologisch gesittigt . ." (II, 132, from the 
study Uber das Mittelalter). Das Gedichtete of Holderlin's text is the 
sublation of these two divergent cultural-artistic tendencies: "gerade 
das griechische Element ist aufgehoben and ausgeglichen gegen ein 
andres, das (zwar ohne ausdruckliche Rechtfertigung) das orien- 
talische gennant war" (II, 126). But, as we have seen, at every point 
where this sublation of Anschauung and Geist, of graphics and 
Gestalt, of Greek and Oriental, manifests itself it is marked by a 
dissonance. Das Gedichtete is a sphere of dissonance: the dissonance 
between graphics and Gestalt and the dissonance within each of these 
domains.' But this differential strife is itself the expression of the limit- 
quality of the concept which the metaconceptual reflection had 
disclosed. As Grenzbegriff between two "absolutes," das Gedichtete 
is constituted as difference; it sets its internal moments, as it were, 
outside of itself, carving a border between them. The infinite concen- 
tration of the Idee as Gestalt corresponds to the intensive totality of 
das Gedicht, the Idee der Losung as fully self-determined form, while 
the infinite extension of graphics (figured in the "Lebendigen" ) 
suggests the totality of das Leben, the Idee der Akfgabe. By breaking 
these two totalities and setting them-broken-into its order, das 
Gedichtete brings the mythic strife to rest. 
The aesthetic fragments provide a certain clue regarding this rest 
or "beruhende Einheit" (II, 124). Both conclude by considering 
related forms that have to do with the unity of the opposed modalities 
of signification. In the first Benjamin asks: "giht es etwa als 
urspriingliche Lage der Schrift auch eine vertikale, etwa in Stein 
gehauen?" (II, 603); which question the second fragment almost 
seems to answer by referring to a spatialized form of the Mal: "Vor 
allem erscheinen sie namlich als Toten- oder Grabmale . . ." (II, 607). 
The point where graphics and Gestalt intersect and pass over into one 
another, where their fundamental dissonance expresses itself as a 
positive, worldly object, is death. This is the process which 
Benjamin's reading identified as Versachlichung, that deadening 
reification which marks the final integration of "gods" and "living" 
into the order of the poem. Thus it is no accident ( rather an index of the 
rigor of his thought) that Benjamin focuses, in the final section of his 19
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reading, on the question of the death of the poet: "Vereint sind im 
Tode, der seine Welt ist, alle erkannten Beziehungen. In ihm ist 
hochste unendliche Gestalt und Gestaltlosigkeit. zeitliche Plastik und 
raumliches Dasein. Idee und Sinnlichkeit" (II. 124). Death is at work 
as the "Mine- and "Ursprung" of das Gedichtete (111124): it is the 
"Einkehr" toward which the poet leads the mythic forms of the gods 
and the living. The I'ersachlichung that results from the dissonance of 
the orders constitutes the overcoming of the mythic, that simul- 
taneous transformation and preservation of the "mythischen 
Verbundenheiten" (II, 126) which, for Benjamin, is the accomplish- 
ment of das Gedichtete, its turn from the sublime to prose. 
Dialectically theological: this was shown to be the nature of 
Benjamin's aesthetic commentary. Why this is the case should now be 
clear. Das Gedichtete, the intersection of Gestalt or the absolute self- 
presence of the gods and graphics or the absolute extension of life, is 
(and is not) the Cross. Theological truth is preserved in a domain in 
which it cannot possibly be. 
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